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ON LEADING A HORSE TO WATER:
NEPA AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
Roger C. Cramton* and Richard K. Berg**
J.

INTRODUCTION

HE process of change in complex social organizations is itself a
highly complex phenomenon, and governmental agencies are
not exempt from this general rule. Presidents and administrators
may come and go, but the civil service-with its inherited policies,
attitudes, and biases-is with us always.1 Moreover, the process by
which governmental decision makers gather information, consider
alternatives, and balance conflicting values may have characteristics
that are highly persistent over time. While it is desirable to overcome unnecessary bureaucratic rigidities, any attempt to improve
this decision-making process must take into account some important
practical limitations.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 2 provides a relatively successful case study of the possibilities, methods,
and limitations on the process of change as applied to agencies of the
federal government. NEPA was intended to make federal agencies
more responsive to environmental considerations and values, which
had been too frequently neglected in governmental decision-making.
In the short time since its enactment, the Act has produced, in addition to a number of judicial victories that have been celebrated by
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I. The difficulties experienced in trying to change the habits and practices of the
federal bureaucracy were concisely expressed by President Truman. Commenting upon
the forthcoming inauguration of General Eisenhower, he said, "He'll sit there • • •
and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that.' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit
like the Army." s. OP0TOWSKY, THE KENNEDY GOVERNMENT 27 (1961).
2. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
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environmentalists,3 a dramatic change in the perspectives of a number of federal agencies.4 Even more change-the steady sure change
that results from building new inputs, values, and arguments into
the decision-making process-is around the corner.
Skepticism concerning the ability of government to respond to
changed social attitudes and policies is widespread today. This is an
age in which any governmental success story needs to be recognized,
emphasized, and given currency. Thus, it is important to chronicle
the success of NEPA as an example of the possibility of orderly social
change. There may be lessons in this experience that reformers can
put to use in other contexts.
But success is not without its dangers. Only the naive or zealous
will perceive necessary and desirable change as cost-free and without
negative side effects; NEPA is no exception. Although the experience
thus far has been a healthy and successful one, there is danger that
the spirit will be undermined-in some agencies-by a mere observance of form that fails to grapple with the underlying realities. Similarly, judicial zeal that interprets NEPA as imposing a detailed procedural code or as requiring the impossible of federal decision
makers will frustrate effective regulation by the federal government
at a time when vigorous regulation is badly needed. You can lead a
horse to water, but it is more difficult to force him to drink; and even
if he does, too much of a good thing is sometimes harmful.
This Article is concerned with the effect of NEPA on administrative decision-making. What benefits has NEPA conferred on us?
What dangers have emerged? What questions remain to be clarified
if NEP A's benefits are to be achieved while minimizing any negative
side effects?
In many respects, NEPA resembles a constitutional charter.5 It
3. Some of the outstanding landmarks have been: Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (environmental impact statement must
consider all "reasonably available" alternatives, including those beyond the agency's
own authority); Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th
Cir. 1972) (work on segment of interstate highway halted pending preparation of an
environmental impact statement although highway project was in progress prior to
effective date of NEPA); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm,, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (AEC rules governing consideration of environmental issues and
relying on water quality standards set by other agencies held invalid under NEPA).
4. Insiders conversant with the Washington scene agree that the AEC and the
Army Corps of Engineers have undergone a dramatic transformation since enactment
of NEPA. Significant changes in the manner and substance of decision-making in the
Departments of Defense, Interior, and Transportation have also been noted.
5. Hanks &: Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and NEPA.,
24 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 230 (1970): "In form, the National Environmental Policy Act is a
statute; in spirit a constitution. • • • In sum, it does not seem farfetched to suggest
that the .•• Act could well become our Environmental Bill of Rights."
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states a general policy in lofty terms, outlines a fragmentary procedure for implementing that policy, and leaves questions of detail to
the good sense of those who must live with and interpret its requirements. The Congress did not attempt to anticipate the administrative adaptation that would be required in applying the Act to the
enormously varied activities of the federal government. Not a line,
not even a word, is addressed to the transitional problem of applying
NEP A's requirements to governmental actions that were virtually
completed or long in motion at the time of enactment-situations in
which it is obvious that commitments have been made that can be
reopened only to a limited degree. 6
The National Environmental Policy Act declares that
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use
all practicable means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to
foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements ·
of present and future generations of Am.ericans.7
The Act goes on to amplify somewhat this none-too-precise statement,
and, in particular, sets out certain procedures that federal agencies
must employ to achieve the goals of the statute. The most significant
and controversial of these procedural demands is the requirement
of section 102(2)(C) that each agency prepare, in connection with
each major action "significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment," a so-called "environmental impact statement" that
must be available to other interested federal, state, and local agencies
and to the public, and must "accompany the proposal through the
existing agency review processes." 8 From this mandate that the statement accompany the proposal through the review process, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which is given certain general
6. NEPA has been broadly applied to federal actions initiated prior to its effective
date of January I, 1970. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109, 1119-22 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Note, Retroactive Application of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 69 MICH. L. REY. 732 (1971). The note of caution implicit in section 11 of the guidelines issued by the Council on Environmental Quality,
36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7727 (1971), which requires agencies to shape further action in
projects commenced prior to 1970 so as to minimize adverse environmental consequences, has not always been fully reflected in the decisions.
Although NEPA immediately imposed an increased burden on federal agencies, no
additional funds were provided. Existing personnel have been required to shoulder the
extra burdens, or new personnel have been hired by diverting funds for that purpose.
Because of the lag in the budgeting and appropriations process, the fiscal year that
began on July I, 1972, offered the first opportunity for most agencies to obtain new
resources for handling the burdens necessitated by NEPA.
7. NEPA § IOl(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970).
8. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
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responsibilities in the administration of the Act,9 has inferred the
concept of the "draft impact statement," which must be circulated
and made public for comment prior to the final agency decision.10
Three years have now passed since enactment of NEPA, and the
sky, despite a multitude of doom-sayers, has not fallen. Environmental impact statements relating to nearly 3,000 agency actions had
been filed with the CEQ as of May 31, 1972, and new statements are
being received at the rate of about five per day.11 In the first two
years under the Act, NEPA generated forty-seven district court decisions, fifteen circuit court decisions, and three Supreme Court dissents, all involving judicial review of administrative actions.12
The experience under NEPA is now sufficient to permit a retrospective appraisal as well as a modest peek at the uncertain world
that lies ahead. Our assessment is that the beneficial aspects of NEPA
easily outweigh the limited negative effects, although the latter may
increase if reviewing courts treat the NEPA requirements as either
highly detailed, inflexible mandates or as all-purpose tools for reversing agency actions with which they have a policy disagreement.
II.

BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF NEPA

The beneficial aspects of NEPA are large in magnitude and
relatively clear in nature.
First, NEPA is an important step in a national reordering of
priorities. For the first time, Congress has declared that federal agencies must consider environmental values along with other relevant
factors in making decisions. The isolation and parochialism that
characterize some governmental agencies-the tendency to be totally
absorbed in the agency's special mission or with its special constituencies-are partially displaced. The agency must now take a larger
view of its functions, placing them in the broader perspective of
"the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all
practicable means, consistent with other essential conditions of
9. NEPA directs agencies to consult with the CEQ concerning methods of ensuring
that environmental values will be considered (§ 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1970))
and to assist the CEQ (§ 102(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(H) (1970)); and the CEQ is directed to review and appraise federal programs in light of NEPA's policy and to make
recommendations to the President. Moreover, Exec. Order No. 11514, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 528
(1972), assigns the CEQ important functions in coordinating activities under NEPA and
issuing guidelines for compliance with it.
IO. The nature and content of the draft environmental impact statement are de•
scribed in section 9(b) of the CEQ guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7726 (1971).
11. 1972 ANN. REP. OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 247.
12. Information supplied to authors by Frederick R. Anderson, Editor, Environ•
mental Law Reporter, Washington, D.C. More than 200 suits have been filed under
NEPA. 1972 ANN, REP. OF THE COUNCIL ON ENv!RONMENTAL QUALITY 249.
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national policy," to avoid degradation of the environment, to preserve "historic, cultural, and natural" resources, and to obtain "the
widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without . . . undesirable and unintended consequences."13
Second, NEPA requires an "airing" of the issues involved in governmental decision-making. It opens formerly closed administrative
procedures to public view and to public comment. This is especially
true, of course, of those decisions relating to use and management
of public property, where there are not, by and large, any statutory
requirements for public hearings or other structured procedures for
obtaining outside views and expertise. The opening or closing of
defense installations,14 storage and transportation of nerve gas,1 5 and
underground explosion of nuclear devices16 are merely examples
of the many administrative actions that are now exposed to public
scrutiny prior to the occurrence of the event because of NEP A's
requirements.
Third, NEPA forces agencies to articulate and to explain their
decisions. Agencies must not only invite and listen to outside comments, but they must in practice respond to such comments. If it is
charged that a certain environmental damage is threatened by a
given project, the environmental impact statement cannot safely
ignore that assertion. The impact statement must either explain why
the agency discounts the threat or why the benefits of the proposed
project are believed to outweigh the dangers.17 The requirement
that agencies examine outside comments and consider them carefully is likely to result in more thoughtful and informed decisionmaking.
Fourth, NEPA contains a built-in mechanism for leading the
bureaucratic horses to environmental waters. While in theory an
agency can draft an impact statement on the basis of a narrow program-oriented perspective and leave it to other agencies to supply
the required "interdisciplinary approach" 18 in their comments, it
13. NEPA § IOI(b), 42 U.S.C. § 433l(b) (1970).
14. E.g., State Comm. To Stop Sanguine v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
Cf. Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972).
15. See, e.g., McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971).
16. The AEC's Amchitka Island weapons test inspired a number of appellate opinions involving environmental effects and public access to records bearing on the environmental problems. See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 3
BNA ENV. REP. CAS. 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 3 BNA ENV. REP. CAS. 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
3 BNA ENv. REP. CAS. 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1971), motion for injunction denied, 404 U.S. 917
(1971); Mink v. EPA, 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971), revd., 41 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S., Jan. 22,
1973).
17. Lathan v. Volpe, 2 ENV. L. REP. 20545 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
18. NEPA § 102(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1970).
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seems unlikely that an agency would permit a proposal to get as far
as the circulation of a draft statement without having pinpointed
and considered the principal environmental objections that might
be raised. To anticipate environmental implications adequately,
many agencies are being forced to acquire new personnel with specialized training in environmental sciences; when these staff members are brought into the planning of projects at an early stage, the
planning process will acquire a broader perspective. In time, the
agency will develop an institutional viewpoint more sympathetic to
environmental, as opposed to purely programmatic, values.
Admittedly, this is largely a prediction rather than an assessment
of the present state of administrative decision-making. The agencies
must guard against a natural but unfortunate tendency to permit the
writing of impact statements to become a form of bureaucratic
gamesmanship, in which newly acquired expertise is devoted not so
much to formulating a project that meets the needs of the environment as to shaping an impact statement to meet the contours
of the agency's preconceived program and to withstand the test of
judicial review.
A great virtue of NEPA's requirements is that they build into
the bureaucracy an instrument for orderly social change. Bureaucratic organizations that have had an effective program of any kind
almost invariably develop a set of attitudes and belief patterns that
enormously influence what they do.19 The personnel of the agency
have undergone common experiences, they often share a common
professional training, and they have devoted their careers to efforts
premised on certain valued assumptions. Thus, a civil engineer who
has devoted the better part of a lifetime to building new highways
as quickly and cheaply as possible to meet the transportation demands of a generation of Americans is threatened when his basic
premises are attacked. Were his efforts wasteful or harmful? The
ability of any group of professionals to react positively to criticism
of this sort is limited. Anger, defensiveness, and stubborn resistance
are more likely reactions.
Under NEPA, however, an agency that attempts to grapple meaningfully with environmental issues is forced to recruit a new phalanx
of professionals with values and perspectives different from its oldline operatives. As the new personnel react with the old, new sets of
shared attitudes and goals may replace those that had hardened into
the bureaucratic structure. Thus, NEPA is a window to the outside
19. See, e.g., E.

REDFORD,

THE

REGULATORY PROCESS

22-38 (1969).
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world; it brings outside comments into the decision-making process
and, through the infusion of new personnel, it introduces new perspectives to the agency.
Finally, NEPA is not a toothless tiger that can be ignored whenever it suits the convenience of a federal agency. The citizen suit
provides an extraordinarily flexible and effective enforcement technique, at least against administrative agencies. 20 The courts have
been vigilant-perhaps even too vigilant-in implementing the
NEPA requirements. In recent years, the courts have broadened the
citizen's right to bring suit and the scope of court review of administrative actions. 21 The willingness of the courts to vindicate environmental values means that governmental agencies must take seriously
the NEPA obligation to consider environmental factors and the
views of outsiders. Industry counsel, knowing that citizen groups
are likely to receive a sympathetic hearing from reviewing courts,
are encouraged to assist agencies in giving proper consideration to
environmental values. Otherwise, industry will suffer from costly
delays resulting from judicial reversal of the decisions of an overly
acquiescent agency. Awareness of the ready availability of judicial
enforcement of NEPA is likely to lead to cooperative enforcement
of the law by agencies and industry representatives.

III.

THE DANGERS OF EXCESSIVE
THE ENFORCEMENT OF

ZEAL

IN

NEPA

Initial reflection on this statutory framework leads one to ask,
"Why is there so much fuss about NEPA?" The policies set forth in
NEPA seem worthy enough, if not platitudinous. Cautious inclusion of terms such as "practicable,"22 "appropriate," 23 and "to the
20. See 1971 ANN. REP. OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 155-70, for a
discussion of the citizen suit.
21. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), a recent environmental case not
involving NEPA, the Court held that the Sierra Club lacked standing to contest the
Forest Service's approval of a plan to construct a ski resort on national forest lands in
the Mineral King Valley because the Club had failed to allege that it or its members
would suffer injury in fact as a result of the proposed development. However, the Court
did not question that threats to scenic, ecological, historical, or aesthetic interests could
constitute sufficient "injury in fact" to confer standing under the Administrative Procedure Act, 405 U.S. at 734, and concluded that once standing was established, the
plaintiff would be able to assert nonpersonal "interests of the general public" in support of his claim, 405 U.S. at 740 n.15. See also Association of Data Proc. Serv. Orgs.,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425
F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); West Virginia Highlands Conservancy
v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
22. NEPA §§ IOI(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 433l(a)-(b) (1970).
23. NEPA §§ 102 (B), (E), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332 (B), (E) (1970).
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fullest extent possible" 24 suggests that the agencies have substantial
discretion in administering the provisions. And the requirements for
the drafting and circulation of impact statements, for solicitation of
comments and the coordination of expertise, seem at first blush to
be no more than the implementation of a directive to the agencies:
"Before you make a major decision, think; think about what it is
you are doing!"
Yet, federal agencies appear to be encountering severe difficulties
in complying with NEPA as it is being construed by reviewing
courts. The current travails of agency decision makers, in our view,
cannot be ascribed wholly to their lethargy or perverseness; some
part of the problem may be traced to a discrepancy between the
nature of the decision-making process as envisioned by NEPA (or,
more accurately, NEPA plus its judicial gloss) and the decisionmaking process as it actually occurs within a governmental agency
or any other bureaucratic organization.
A.

Uncertainties in the Meaning and Application of NEPA
I. Application of the Impact Statement Requirement

Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires "all agencies of the Federal
Government" to "include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" 25 a detailed
environmental impact statement. NEPA, as Judge Friendly has
said, is "a relatively new statute so broad, yet opaque, that it will
take even longer than usual fully to comprehend its import."26
Already, however, it is apparent that "major" means "any" and
that "significantly affecting" means "affecting." Indeed, some decisions indicate that the agency bears the burden of showing that
the proposed action does not meet these tests and must issue an
impact statement "whenever the action arguably will have an
adverse environmental impact."27 Given the subjective quality of
the Act's qualifying language and the breadth with which the
courts have interpreted it, the issuance of environmental impact
24. NEPA§ 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
26. City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
27. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures v. United States, 346 F.
Supp. 189, 201 (D.D.C. 1972) (emphasis original). See also 346 F. Supp. at 199. Another
case holds that even the threshold determination of environmental impact requires
affirmative steps to develop an administrative record and, in effect, a "mini-impact
statement." Hanly v. Kleindienst, 31 An. L.2d 922 (2d Cir., Dec. 5, 1972).
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statements promises to become a routine occurrence in many areas
of public administration.
Thus, it is difficult to imagine any action in the energy field so
inconsequential that an impact statement would not be required. 28
Since abandonment or certification of transportation facilities is
likely to affect the volume of total traffic or the share held by motor
vehicles, a wide range of actions by transportation agencies is also
subject to the environmental statement requirement. 29 Thus far
only a few functions, notably the issuance of price orders under
the Emergency Stabilization Act,30 have been held exempt from the
impact statement requirement. Even in the few cases in which an
action of extremely limited environmental significance is contemplated, such as a short-term military landing exercise involving
900 Marines in a state park commonly visited by as many as 6,000
persons per day in the summer months, the searching nature of
the judicial inquiry ensures that environmental issues will be
adequately protected. 31
28. See, e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3184 (U.S., Oct. 3, 1972) (FPC certificate for construction of an
electric transmission line); Wilderness Soc. v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970),
revd., Nos. 72-1796, 72-1797 & 72-1798 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 9, 1973) (Interior Department
permits for the Alaskan pipeline and its related road haul).
29. In City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), Judge
Friendly held that the ICC erred in failing to prepare an environmental statement in
connection with the abandonment of 1.8 miles of a terminal rail line in the New York
City area, since abandonment of the rail line would affect the environment by increasing truck traffic. Similarly, it has been held that the ICC erred by failing to prepare an
adequate environmental impact statement when approving a rail rate increase affecting
the relative costs of transporting recyclable and primary materials. See text accompanying notes 49-53 infra. The same or similar arguments are applicable to many licensing
and rate proceedings in transportation agencies. One recent case, however, holds that a
decision allowing a rate to go into effect without suspension and investigation is not
subject to the NEPA requirements. Port of New York Authority v. United States, 451
F.2d 783 {2d Cir. 1971). Construction projects in metropolitan areas that threaten to
increase the burden on transportation facilities may also be subject to the impact statement requirement. See Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972) (construction of
jail and office facilities in New York City).
30. Cohen v. Price Commn., 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The case arose on
a motion for a preliminary injunction against a fare increase, and thus the opinion
does not constitute a final determination on the applicability of NEPA to the Price
Commission. However, the language and reasoning of the court's opinion strongly point
to the conclusion that NEPA is inapplicable.
31. Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972). The Defense Department in this case made elaborate preparations for the landing exercise, and
the agreement with park authorities reflected environmental concerns, including a requirement that vehicles would be confined to existing roads. John Nolan, a Washington
attorney, has wryly commented that, if the arrangements had provided for a smaller
complement of chemical toilets, the decision might well have gone the other way. Remarks delivered at the ABA-ALI Course of Study on Environmental I.aw II at the
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., Feb. 17, 1972.

520

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:511

2. Substantive Effect
One area of considerable uncertainty is how NEPA operates to
affect the decisional equation in each agency. There is no question
that NEPA requires decision-making procedures that will permit
agencies to take environmental values into account. But what
weight is to be given to such values when they conflict with the
values expressed or implicit in the statute the agency is administering? Section 105 of NEPA simply states that the policies and goals
of NEPA are "supplementary" to those set forth in the agencies'
existing authorizations,32 thus providing little practical guidance.
A case in point is Zabel v. Tabb, 33 in which the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit upheld the refusal of the Army Corps of
Engineers to grant a dredging permit, when such refusal was based
on ecological grounds. The applicants for the permit had argued
that the Corps could refuse such a permit only when the dredging
would represent an obstruction to navigation.34 The court rejected
this contention, basing its conclusion, in part, on NEP A. 35 The
Zabel case has been interpreted to mean that "NEPA serves to aid
Federal agencies which, in the absence of NEPA might be forced
to operate under mandates arguably incompatible with environmentally responsible decisionmaking." 36
While the result in Zabel appears correct, we are not certain
that every agency that presently has statutory authority to exercise
some measure of discretion in a matter involving private rights or
interests is now empowered to consider environmental factors as
well as those factors relevant under the agency's basic statute.
Ordinarily, when an agency is granted discretionary authority, that
discretion is to be exercised within certain limits and for the accomplishment of certain statutory purposes. These limitations on
agency action provide a focus for agency programs and a check on
arbitrariness. They should not lightly be set aside or diluted.
Let us take an extreme example. Under the Securities Act of
1933,37 most investment securities may not be sold to the general
public until a registration statement conforming to the requirements of the Securities Act is filed with the SEC and in effect. A
32. 42 u.s.c. § 4335 (1970).
33. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
34. 430 F .2d at 203.
35. 430 F.2d at 211·13.
36. Remarks of Timothy B. Atkeson, General Counsel, CEQ, reprinted at 118 CONG.
REc. El626, 1628 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1972).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970).
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registration statement takes effect twenty days after filing, but the
Commission may, in its discretion, accelerate the effective date and
ordinarily does so when it is satisfied that the statement affords
adequate disclosure to prospective investors.38 The dynamics of the
securities market are such that a failure to obtain acceleration is
quite likely to frustrate the entire offering. Does NEPA permit or
require the SEC, in deciding whether or not to accelerate effectiveness of a corporation's proposal to sell stock to finance expansion, to
take into account the environmental effects of the issuer's plans for
expansion? Or, to give another example, may the Internal Revenue
Service refuse to give a tax ruling on a proposed transaction on the
ground that the transaction will have adverse environmental effects?
If the Service refuses to give the ruling, the transaction may be
abandoned as too risky, and the Internal Revenue Code seldom
purports to distinguish between taxpayers on the basis of a transaction's environmental effects.39
NEPA, in our view, is not directed at these situations. It should
not be interpreted as granting to every federal agency a roving commission to defend the environment wherever its writ runs, irrespective of the nature of the subject matter before it.
Some distinctions are necessary. One of the difficulties in dealing
with NEPA is that it appears to have been drafted to deal with one
type of administrative decision, the big federal or federally financed
project, where the government's discretion to go forward or to
refrain from doing so is substantially unlimited. NEPA should be
applied with caution to governmental programs that regulate what
are essentially private activities. Government, of course, cannot be
indifferent to the environmental effects of private action. Regulation of such action, however, is best accomplished by agencies
specifically empowered to do so on a general basis, and not through
a hit-or-miss system by which agencies impose conditions or restrictions extraneous to the statutory programs they are charged with
administering.
3. Legislative Proposals
With all this ferment, it is paradoxical that the environmental
impact statement has had virtually no effect as yet on the legislative
process.40 The notice-and-comment procedures envisioned by NEPA
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77(fl.) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 202.3 (1972).
39. But cf. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 169.
40. Section 102(c) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), provides that all agencies of the
federal government shall include an impact statement in "every recommendation or
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seem peculiarly well-adapted to public airing and discussion of
issues raised by major legislative proposals. Furthermore, Congress
is much less restricted than particular agencies in the alternatives
that it can consider and act upon. Yet, fewer than two hundred
environmental impact statements have been filed in connection
with legislative proposals,41 and many of them have involved recent
Administration proposals to improve the environment-a category
of legislation that is hardly the central concern of NEPA. Surely
among the thousands of bills introduced in Congress and the
hundreds enacted during the past three years, there have been a great
many that have had or would have had substantial and adverse effects
on the environment. One reaches the reluctant conclusion that
NEPA has been virtually a dead letter in this respect. Congress
appears to be considering and enacting legislation even though
federal agencies have not prepared and filed the required statements.
The failure of Congress to observe the NEPA requirements when
its own affairs are involved cannot but give comfort to those agency
officials who are disinclined to take NEPA seriously.
The problem with respect to NEP A's application to legislative
proposals is, of course, the unavailability of an effective enforcement mechanism. The broadened scope of judicial review at the
behest of the citizen group has become accepted as a matter of
course when agency action is under attack, but no court to date
has had the temerity to enjoin legislation as to which an environmental impact statement was not filed or to enjoin Congress from
considering a bill when the NEPA requirements have not been met.
Any effort to do so would run the risk of a constitutional crisis;
thus, only Congress can enforce NEPA's application to legislative
proposals.42
report on proposals for legislation ••• significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment." The general statement in the text should be viewed in light of the fact
that congressional debate on a number of important public issues-such as the supersonic transport, the Amchitka underground nuclear test, and various public works
projects-has focused on environmental impact statements prepared by the concerned
agencies.
41. According to information supplied to the authors by the CEQ staff, 163 impact
statements on legislative proposals had been filed as of November 30, 1972.
42. The Senate Committee on Public Works, apparently alone among congressional
committees, has adopted a rule that it will not consider a legislative proposal unless
an environmental statement has been filed. Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339
F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), indicates that continuing projects may run into NEPA
difficulties despite long-standing congressional support. In this case, the TVA was enjoined from completing the Tellico Dam project for which Congress had appropriated
funds in 1966 and which had been under construction since early 1967.
Another relevant case, Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, No. 102971 (D.D.C., filed May 25, 1971), is currently pending. Plaintiffs are seeking to compel
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4. Actions Subject to Rule-Making Procedures

Because NEPA has not had a substantial effect on the legislative
process, its primary application has been to (I) administrative
actions that fall within the "rule making" or "adjudication" provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 43 and (2) informal administrative actions that are not subject to these provisions
of the APA.
The general effect of NEPA in opening up to public scrutiny
many informal administrative functions that previously were not
subject to any procedural requirements has already been mentioned.
In essence, NEPA imposes a notice-and-comment rule-making
procedure on informal administrative actions whatever their quality
or character. Although there are serious uncertainties concerning
whether or not any given agency action is subject to the NEPA
requirements, and, if so, what the impact statement must include,
the simple notice-and-comment procedure of the kind envisioned
by the CEQ guidelines may be applied without undue strain to
informal administrative actions. Obviously, where agency actions
are already subject to the notice-and-comment rule-making procedures of the AP A, there should be no difficulty in complying with
the essentially similar requirements of NEPA within the framework
of existing procedures.

5. Decisions Made After a Trial-Type Hearing
The application of NEPA, however, to administrative decisions
that are required to be made on the basis of a record (whether
"rule making" or "adjudication" as defined in the AP A) raises more
serious questions, in large part because NEPA provides that the
environmental impact statement "shall accompany the [agency's]
proposal through the existing agency review processes."44 This requirement fails to reflect the variety and complexity of trial-type
proceedings. Three recent federal court opinions-Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC,45 Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Morton,46 and Greene County Planning Board v.
the AEC to file an environmental impact statement in connection with its request for
congressional authorization and appropriation for the development of the liquid-metal
fast breeder reactor as a source of electric power. See l ENV. L. REP. 65153-54 (1971).
43.
44.
45.
46.

5 u.s.c. §§ 553-54 (1970).
NEPA§ 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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FPC47-when read together, suggest the possibility of a hair-splitting
literalism in applying NEPA that is reminiscent of the technicalities
of common law pleading. Most of the worrisome language in these
opinions is dicta, however, and, it is hoped, will not be applied in
cases involving different fact situations. But the direction of some
judicial thinking is sufficiently troublesome to warrant a word of
caution.
In Greene County, which involved a Federal Power Commission
proceeding for certification of a short transmission line connecting
an existing pumped storage facility to another part of the utility's
distribution system, intervenors opposing certification of the line
on environmental grounds challenged the failure of the Commission
staff to prepare and circulate its own draft environmental impact
statement prior to the evidentiary hearing on the application. The
utility had, as required by FPC rules, submitted a proposed environmental impact statement in support of its application. While
the FPC's rules in effect at the time required the Commission staff
to prepare its own draft impact statement in uncontested cases, the
procedure in contested cases was for the staff to review the applicant's statement as to sufficiency of form and to circulate it for
comment to other interested agencies, but not to prepare a draft
statement prior to the hearing. The court held that the agency
could not accept the utility's proposed statement as the draft environmental statement that must be made available prior to the
hearing.48 The agency staff must draft its own statement whether
or not the issues to be canvassed at the formal hearing are fully
revealed in the applicant's statement.
This result seems questionable. While it is doubtless appropriate
to place a burden on the agency to consider and prepare its own
final environmental statement, the question prior to the hearing
should be viewed as one of adequate notice to other governmental
agencies and potential intervenors. NEPA is not intended to restructure the agency decision-making process. NEPA takes the
agency review process as it finds it and simply requires that the
environmental statement accompany the proposal through that
process. If that process is one in which the proposal originates outside the agency and in which the staff may assume a neutral posture
or even not participate at all-as in many ICC proceedings-why
is not a draft statement from the proponent of the action sufficient?
No satisfactory answer to this question can be found in the
47. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. !1184 (U.S., Oct. !I, 1972).
48. 455 F.2d at 421-22.
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Greene County opinion, or in the similar decision in Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures v. United States. 49 The
SCRAP case involved an ICC decision allowing rates affecting the
shipment of recyclable materials to become effective for a limited
period of time. The court concluded that the carriers' "self-serving"
analysis of environmental impact could not be an adequate basis
for the ICC action150 and that "the Commission's own investigative
apparatus" must be used "to uncover possible environmental effects
of the action." 51 While the holding in this case is distinguishable
from Greene County in that it was based upon the inadequacy of
the agency's final impact statement rather than the draft statement,52
the cases are similar in demanding of the agency staff independent
and active consideration of the environmental issues at every stage
of the proceeding. This attitude is also reflected in the court's statement, made in response to the ICC's contention that the procedures
mandated by NEPA are too slow and cumbersome to apply to
temporary rate increases, that the Commission had not satisfied
its "heavy burden of proof" in attempting to show that full compliance with NEPA was impossible.53
The Calvert Cliffs' case, taken in conjunction with Greene
County, may be read to suggest that a mandatory hearing must be
held in a license or certificate proceeding even though the staff and
the parties are in full agreement that no environmental issues are
presented and there are no intervenors who seek to contest the application on environmental grounds. Thus, Judge Wright's opinion
in Calvert Cliffs' states that in "uncontested hearings" the agency
must give careful examination to the draft statement to determine
whether staff review has been adequate, and "it must independently
consider the final balance among conflicting values that is struck
in the staff's recommendation."54 It must be emphasized, however,
that Calvert Cliffs' involved the Atomic Energy Act, a statute that
provides for a mandatory hearing before a license to construct a
power plant is issued. 55 Consequently, it is doubtful that the court
49. 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972).
50. 346 F. Supp. at 193 n.4.
51. 346 F. Supp. at 194.95 n.8.
52. The portions of the opinion discussing the adequacy of ICC draft impact statements and the role of the staff relate to agency decisions which were held to be either
moot or not ripe for review; however, the opinion as a whole reflects basic agreement
with the Greene County approach.
53. 346 F. Supp. at 199.
54. 449 F.2d at HIS.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1970).
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intended to imply that a hearing is required on uncontested environmental issues when, under the agency's practice, a hearing
would not be required on other uncontested issues.
When agency procedures provide for hearings on contested
issues, what kind of dispute is necessary to force a hearing on environmental issues? Here, Calvert Cliffs' casts a long shadow. There
is, after all, little that man can do to his environment that would
be regarded by all as an unalloyed benefit. It is hard to imagine
construction of any utility plant or facility that would not involve
some environmental minuses, at least on aesthetic grounds. Thus,
the action of a federal agency in approving such construction will
typically, almost invariably, involve acceptance of a trade-off: power
for scenery, air pollution, radiation, or what have you. What happens when an environmentalist does not dispute the basic data put
forward in the utility's proposal or environmental statement, but
disagrees as to the agency's ultimate decision? Or, perhaps, the environmentalist urges consideration of an alternative. Can he force a
hearing?
The cases have not yet answered this question, but if one takes
as a point of departure the views of Judge Wright that "all possible
environmental factors [must be included] in the decisional equation" in order to achieve "a rather finely tuned and 'systematic'
balancing analysis in each instance," 56 and that "[c]onsiderations
of administrative difficulty, delay or economic cost will not suffice
to strip [section 102 of NEPA] of its fundamental importance," 57
then any objecting party with a spark of imagination should be
able to force a full evidentiary hearing. Yet, surely there is a need
for flexibility here. One does not need a scale to determine that an
elephant weighs more than a horse. Agencies should be permitted to
require some sort of threshold showing by environmentalists that
the balance on a particular proposal is likely to be reasonably close
and to turn on disputed questions of fact before a hearing becomes
mandatory. After all, trials are expensive and time-consuming, and,
at best, an imperfect tool for reaching value judgments with respect
to environmental issues. However elaborate the decisional process,
the principal ingredients cannot really be reduced to a common
denominator. Even the most finely tuned and systematic balancing
analysis must rely in large part on factors that defy precise measurement.
It seems ironic that a statute designed to produce a rational
56. 449 F.2d at 1113.
57. 449 F.2d at 1115.
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agency decision-making process, in which competing values are
balanced in a considered fashion, should itself be interpreted to
contain requirements that cannot be balanced against opposing
considerations such as "administrative difficulty, delay or economic
cost." Yet this is the view of NEPA one finds in the Calvert Cliffs'
and Greene County opinions, a view only partially qualified in
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton. In this last case,
Judge Leventhal concluded that NEPA's requirement that alternatives be discussed must be interpreted under a "rule of
reason." 58 One might further hope that reasonableness will also
hold sway in assessing the procedures employed by agencies in
applying the NEPA requirements to the highly variegated administrative universe. 59
B. Disadvantages of Requiring an Unrealistic Exploration
of Consequences and Alternatives

In Calvert Cliffs', the District of Columbia Circuit rebuffed an
attempt by the AEC to simplify its environmental decision-making
in nuclear plant license proceedings by adopting a rule foreclosing
consideration of the effects of thermal pollution on water quality
if the proposed discharges would not violate the water quality
standards administered by the state in which the plant was to be
operated and were approved by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). The rule was struck down, not merely because the
court felt it represented an abdication to the state agency of the
AEC's NEPA responsibility, but, more significantly, because the
court read NEPA to require "a case-by-case balancing judgment"60
by federal agencies. Judge Wright stated:
In each individual case, the particular economic and technical benefits of planned action must be assessed and then weighed against
58. 458 F.2d at 834.
59. A recent decision on remand of the Natural Resources Defense Council case to
the district court suggests an even further refinement for those who wish to adopt the
strategy of delay. When an agency amends a draft environmental statement to discuss
issues not previously considered, the ninety-day period provided by the CEQ guidelines
for notice-and-comment to other governmental agencies and members of the public
runs anew. In common law pleading terms, the variance is fatal and the exhausted
pleader must start afresh, as the Secretary of Interior then did. Secretary Morton, however, was not content with his fate. The newspapers carried stories of his "bitter disappointment" over court decisions that have delayed governmental programs aimed at
developing natural resources and have tended, in his view, to shift governmental responsibilities from executive departments to the judiciary "where the criteria and understanding so requisite for fundamental resource decisions do not exist." Washington
Evening Star, Feb. 10, 1972, at A-3.
60. 449 F.2d at 1123,
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the environmental costs; alternatives must be considered which
would affect the balance of values. The magnitude of possible benefits and possible costs may lie anywhere on a broad spectrum . . ..
The point of the individualized balancing analysis is to ensure that,
with possible alterations, the optimally beneficial action is finally
taken.61

While, in theory, it may be desirable for each governmental decision
having a significant environmental impact to be reached after
thorough exploration of the consequences and individualized balancing among all available alternatives, such a requirement imposes a
great and perhaps intolerable strain on the decision-making process.
The decision-making process involved in these cases is exceedingly complicated.62 Typically, it involves trade-offs among values,
many of them impossible to quantify. Perhaps air or water pollution
can be decreased through a change in plant design involving considerable additional costs. Perhaps decreased water pollution can be
accomplished at the expense of greater air pollution, or vice versa.
Quite possibly, objectionable pollution is unavoidable unless a
different site is selected. Perhaps the project can be substantially
altered or abandoned entirely. Each of these choices brings different
consequences in its train.
Any decision maker must attempt to reduce his more complicated decisions to manageable size. Usually Congress helps by
providing directives or policy guidance in statutes governing specific
programs. For example, statutory directives do not require the Department of Agriculture to recalculate the long-range effects of various crop support programs before deciding the allowable acreage in
a given year. The Department of Transportation, unfortunately in
our view, is not free to decide that we have enough highways and
therefore the highway trust fund should be spent for something else.
Agency administrators, through regulations, directives, and the like,
attempt to guide future implementation of their programs, not
merely to inform and to instruct their less enlightened subordinates,
but to enable the business of the agency to go forward without an
endless re-examination of first principles. NEPA does not, of course,
explicitly require such a continuous re-examination of first principles.
What it does do, in the view of Judge Wright in Calvert Cliffs', is
require a consideration of alternatives as part of an "individualized
balancing analysis [leading to an] optimally beneficial action." 63
61. 449 F.2d at 1123.
62. See Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving
Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L R.Ev. 111 (1972).
63. 449 F.2d at 1123.
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But when program values are viewed as in constant and fluid competition with environmental values, first principles can never be
very firmly established.
Certainly, analysis of the environmental impact of a proposal
must involve consideration and evaluation of alternatives. But to
select among alternatives, one must be able to measure their relative
merits in terms of some standard or objective, the validity of which
is assumed. Such a standard or objective represents in itself a choice
among alternatives that has presumably been made at an anterior
point in time, perhaps at a higher governmental level, on the basis
of another and more general norm.
For example, what is the range of alternatives that the AEC
should consider in the context of a particular licensing proceeding?64
Clearly, the desirability of particular design changes in the plant
should be investigated. Possibly it would be useful to evaluate
alternative sites for the plant in the same general area. Should the
AEC also consider whether the locality would be better off environmentally with a fossil fuel plant? If so, should it consider the environmental disadvantages of oil spills or strip mining where the
fuel is produced? Should the AEC consider whether it would be
preferable to provide power by transmission from other areas or
even whether the community should do without the additional
power capacity? The Calvert Cliffs' opinion does not discuss at any
length what range of alternatives the AEC must consider, since that
question was not before the court. But an outgrowth of that decision may be to encourage public intervenors in AEC licensing
proceedings to raise issues related to the merits of alternative sites or
to the technical feasibility of available alternative sources of power
-a development that could lead to a geometric increase in the
factual questions to be resolved in each proceeding.65
This question regarding alternatives presents particular diffi.64. See Cramton, Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L.
R.Ev. 585 (1972), for a brief discussion of current procedural problems in AEC licensing
and regulation.
65. See generally Murphy, The National Environmental Policy A.ct and the Licensing Process: .Magna Carta or Coup de Grace?, 72 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 963 (1972). The Greene
County case requires that issues discussed in the draft environmental statement be
open for testimony and cross-examination at the hearing:
[WJe deem it essential that the Commission's staff should prepare a detailed statement before the Presiding Examiner issues his initial decision. Moreover, the intervenors must have a reasonable opportunity to comment on the statement. But,
since the statement may well go to waste unless it is subject to the full scrutiny or
the hearing process, we also believe that the intervenors must be given the opportunity to cross-examine both [utility] and Commission witnesses in light of the
statement ••••
455 F.2d at 422,
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culties when, as in the AEC situation, agency action is required to
be taken only after a formal trial-type proceeding. As long as the
agency procedure is informal and managerial in nature, the agency
can control to a great degree the extent to which alternatives are
explored, can rely on other agency evaluations, and can terminate
an inquiry when it appears that the alternative is unlikely to prove
feasible. In a formal trial-type proceeding with adversary parties,
it is extremely difficult for the presiding officer to limit evidence or
questioning regarding available alternatives and their environmental consequences. Nor can complicated issues be broken down
easily into subunits and resolved separately. Indeed, as a protection
against judicial review, an officer conducting a formal hearing is
generally well advised to permit the parties to get anything they
desire into the record even though the end result is more data than
any human mind can comprehend.
The decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton adds a new dimension
to the problem of alternatives. In that case, the court held that the
Interior Department's impact statement, filed in connection with a
proposal for a sale of offshore oil and gas leases, was deficient because it failed to consider adequately the possibility of eliminating
oil import quotas as a means of supplying needed fuel. While conceding that NEPA required only the consideration of "reasonably
available" 66 alternatives, the court rejected the government's contention that "availability" is measured by the authority of the
agency in question to put the alternative into effect.67 This approach
goes well beyond Calvert Cliffs' and in one respect contradicts it.
In Calvert Cliffs', the court emphasized that the impact statement
must not merely "accompany" the proposal through the agency
process, but rather must actually be taken into account in agency
decision-making. 68 Natural Resources Defense Council, however,
apparently envisages a discussion of alternatives that are beyond the
power of the decision maker to effect. 69
66. 458 F .2d at 834.
67. 458 F.2d at 835.
68. 449 F.2d at 1117-18.

69. Alternatives that an agency is powerless to adopt may, of course, serve as a
basis for a refusal to act. But can the AEC, for example, which is charged by statute
with the duty to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy, refuse to license nuclear
power plants on the ground that the Interior Department should supply the needed
energy by expanded off-shore oil leasing, or that the states should abandon oil pro•
rationing, or that the President and Congress should eliminate the oil import quota
program? Would not such a decision be viewed as a grave dereliction of duty? The
absence of a national energy policy and an all-powerful agency to administer it cannot
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We must bear in mind the inherent limitations on the capacity
of a complex bureaucracy to explore alternatives. In arguing for
the necessity of making decisions through successive limited comparisons-the "science of muddling through" 70-Charles Lindblom
has written:
Nothing would be more paralyzing to an administrator than to take
seriously the prescription ... that he make no decision until he
[has canvassed] all possible alternative ways of reaching well formulated goals, making sure that he has investigated every possible
alternative. He can only "get a little outside" his regular routine by
practicing some strategy that gives him some direction without
asking for the impossible. 71
Proposals for agency action generally filter up from below or
from the field; they are, and must be, shaped primarily by known
statutory and programmatic goals. In some situations, such as license
applications, the request or proposal is not even initiated by the
agency itself, and the agency may have no authority either to compel
acceptance of an alternative or to ensure approval by another governmental authority.
The requirement of considering alternatives raises another
problem that goes to the heart of the NEPA structure. One of the
basic rationales for the broad delegation of discretionary authority
to administrative agencies is their presumed expertise. This presumption may be a legal fiction to some extent,72 but there is
certainly validity to the proposition that agencies can make more
informed judgments with respect to subjects with which they
regularly deal than with respect to subjects beyond their experience.
Yet, in considering the range of alternatives, the agencies have been
thrust into areas beyond their specialized knowledge. It is true that
they may look to more expert agencies for assistance and advice, but
the final decision, the task of individualized case-by-case balancing,
rests with the agency responsible for the proposed action. It may
well be argued that prior to NEPA agencies were constantly making
be viewed by one agency as an excuse for not pursuing the narrower mandate that
Congress has given the agency. NEPA does not mandate what can only be viewed as
"government by impasse."
70. See Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through", in READINGS ON MODERN
154 (A. Etzioni ed. 1969) [hereinafter READINGS].
71. Contexts for Change and Strategy: A Reply, in READINGS, supra note 70, at 172.
72. Cf. Chief Judge Bazelon's comment in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971), to the effect that courts should not
be "taken in" by the supposed "expertise" of agencies, which may confuse expertise
with policy or use it in the service of special interests.
ORGANIZATIONS
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decisions with consequences they were ill-equipped to foresee or
evaluate, and that NEPA at least focuses efforts in the right direction. The problem is probably manageable enough in the context
of informal procedures. However, difficulties are foreseeable in
formal proceedings where agency comments must presumably be
tested by the rules of evidence.73
We have pointed out before that NEP A:s basic approach is to
take the agency decision-making process as it finds it, and essentially
to require that environmental considerations be factored into agency
determinations in whatever forum and at whatever level they are
raised. Many of the difficulties we have considered here seem traceable, at least in part, to NEP A's tacit and, we suggest, over-optimistic
assumption that existing decision-making processes are, in a sense,
elastic and can be stretched to accommodate the infusion of new
and complex issues without losing their essential character. But
agency modes of decision-making are not devised in a vacuum. For
the most part, they are designed to be responsive to the kinds of
issues the agency is called upon to resolve. If there is a dramatic
change in the number and the nature of the issues to be resolved, as
has happened since the enactment of NEPA, it cannot be assumed
that the old modes of decision-making can easily be adapted to
handle the new subject matter.
Nowhere is this point more evident than in trial-type hearings.
Such proceedings work best when issues are few and narrowly defined, ideally when the proceeding is intended to ascertain the facts
to which previously announced principles of law or policy will be
applied. Procedures in many agencies, of course, departed from this
ideal long before the enactment of NEPA, and complaints are numerous of the rambling formlessness of hearings when voluminous
questions of fact, law, and policy are sought to be resolved in a single
proceeding.
Our point is that ·trial-type hearings and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the more informal modes of bureaucratic decision-making are
generally designed to apply settled principles to situations differing
only marginally from those previously encountered. Such modes of
73. In Greene County the court stated that the FPC could not "fulfill the demand•
ing standard of 'careful and informed decisionmaking' [of NEPA if it] can disregard
impending plans for further power development.••. [W]e cannot tolerate the Com•
mission cutting back on its expanded responsibility by blinding itself to potential de•
velopments notwithstanding its lack of authority to compel future, alternate construe•
tion." 455 F.2d at 424. If evidence and cross-examination must be allowed on issues,
even though they are not within the power of the agency, the hearing in fact will be
devoted to issues that are irrelevant in the fundamental sense that the agency cannot
act upon them (except by denying the application).
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"incremental" decision-making are frequently ill suited for resolving such cosmic issues as those with which NEPA is forcing the agencies to grapple.
Some basic rethinking of program goals and their environmental
effects is in order, as well as some basic restructuring of the governmental apparatus to achieve better coordination of these goals. It
may well be that new formats for decision-making need to be devised, but this rethinking and restructuring cannot be accomplished
by judicial fiat and cannot come all at once. In the meantime, society
must be prepared to accept those ordinary decisional processes that
operate within fairly narrow ranges of alternatives.
•
Finally, attention needs to be given to the reference in Calvert
Cliffs' to the goal of selecting "the optimally beneficial action." Perhaps too much should not be made of this language.u Everyone
would agree that a major goal of NEPA is to provide a procedure
that permits agencies to make more informed decisions as to "optimally beneficial action," and it may be that the court meant to
suggest no more than that. It would be a mistake, however, for the
courts to regard NEPA as a mandate to the agencies to act in each
case in strict accord with the scientific method and the dictates of
pure reason. We would do well to recall the French saying, "The
best is the enemy of the good." Any administrator knows that to be
able to act with full knowledge of the available alternatives and their
consequences is an unobtainable luxury. Usually he must act without any great confidence that his choice is the "optimally beneficial"
one, and perhaps even with no more than an intuition that his selection is marginally better than continued inaction.
It is inevitable in our political system that many significant decisions will represent compromises of one kind or another. These
compromises will reflect not only a balancing of rational values, but
frequently the vectors of contending forces. We do not believe that
NEPA requires decisions on federal projects or expenditures to be
made without regard for the views of influential congressmen, the
power of contending interests, and the intensity of feeling of constituent groups. 711 NEPA, in short, does not inaugurate the reign of the
74. Yet the phrase appears twice in the opinion: "most intelligent, optimally beneficial decision," 449 F.2d at 1114, and "optimally beneficial action," 449 F.2d at 112!1.
75. While administrative agencies should be required to give reasons for their actions
and cannot make choices that are whimsical or violative of constitutional standards,
their policy conclusions may properly contain large elements of intuition, popular
emotion, or prudent compromise. This is particularly true when Congress has failed
to place the decision-making process in a judicial mold by reqniring that it be made
"on the record after opportunity for a hearing." Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). In a democracy, the policy choices reached by political institutions cannot invariably be disinter-
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philosopher-king; it would be wrong and ultimately futile to hold
the agencies to such a standard.
IV.

THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION UNDER

NEPA

An important and much disputed issue is the extent to which
the judiciary should be relied upon for major decisions of environmental policy. The traditional formulas of judicial review limit a
court's role to consideration of questions of law, abuse of discretion,
or lack of adequate evidence. Thus, administrative action taken in
violation of a procedural requirement must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. An agency must demonstrate that a
novel and important policy or program is within its legislative authorization. If a decision is taken on the basis of a record, the agency's
conclusion must find a reasoned basis in substantial evidence revealed in the light of the whole record. The tasks imposed on the
judiciary by these formulas are not wooden or limited, but require
the utmost of wise and creative judgment.
We do not believe, however, that it is the function of a reviewing court to balance the conflicting values that have been placed by
the legislature in the hands of administrators. While we are all aware
of the fashionable theories that administrative agencies are either
captives of those whom they regulate or wedded to the promotional
missions that led to their creation,76 it is neither sound theory nor
prudent practice to place primary reliance on the judiciary to supervise governmental action in the environmental field. The courts
may occasionally preserve the status quo in instances where improper
agency action threatens to disturb it, but administrative agencies are
needed to provide the motive power for necessary alterations of the
status quo.
The American experience suggests that agencies and administrators are capable of effective action; indeed, even the alteration of the
American environment of which environmentalists complain is due
in part to the efficient efforts of administrators pursuing other missions. Effective action to preserve and protect environmental values,
such as the design and administration of a rational system of pollution standards or charges, is dependent upon the sustained and enerested, perfectly rational, or even internally consistent. It is enough that they have been
arrived at by means of an appropriate and rational process. The "Three Sisters Bridge
Case," D.C. Federation of Civic Assns. v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972), appears to impose requirements that may be ap•
propriate for judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings but are quite out of keeping with the
nature of the decision-making there involved.
76. See generally Cramton, The Why, Where, and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 525-30 (1972).
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getic efforts of administrators. The courts cannot perform such
functions.
Environmentalists should remember that freewheeling judicial
review, like the NEPA requirements themselves, is a two-edged
sword. Industry representatives desiring to preserve a status quo
favorable to their continued exploitation of natural resources may
bring their own suits to restrain and delay governmental actions,
relying on precedents set in the victories of the environmentalists.
In National Helium Corp. v. Morton 71 an industry group utilized
NEPA to block a Department of the Interior action that would have
terminated helium leases. NEPA has also been used to make broad
attacks on the EPA regulatory program for implementing the Clean
Air Act,78 and the Corps of Engineers' discharge permit program
under the Refuse Act. 79 While the challenge to the Refuse Act permit system has become academic as a result of provisions in the 1972
Water Pollution Control Amendments transferring these functions
to the EPA and exempting them from NEPA,80 there are still many
areas in which NEPA can be used to delay environmental protection
as well as to enforce it. And it might well be asked why it was
thought necessary to exempt the EPA from the requirements of the
Act. Certainly the decisions of this agency have a more direct and
immediate effect on the environment than the actions of most other
sectors of government, and it possesses environmental expertise far
beyond that available to other agencies. Nor can it be a sufficient
answer to say that the EPA should be exempted because its primary
77. 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan. 1971).
78. In Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del. 1972), the court
rejected a NEPA challenge to a compliance order issued by the Administrator of the
EPA pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970). The court assumed
without deciding that NEPA applied to EPA approval of a state implementation plan,
but concluded that the claim of noncompliance with NEPA in approving the plan
could not be raised by attacking the compliance order. In addition, the court noted that
the Administrator had no discretion to waive the standards for sulphur content of fuel
established by statute, and that compliance with the impact statement requirement of
NEPA in exercising prosecutorial discretion whether to institute enforcement proceedings "would unnecessarily impede effective enforcement of the Clean Air Act." 342
F. Supp. at 1022.
See also 1972 ANN. REP. OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 255:
In at least three cases, representatives of the cement, chemicals, and electric
power industries have challenged EPA's regulations limiting air pollution emissions from new industrial plants. The companies argue that the regulations are
major Federal actions that significantly affect the environment; therefore 102
statements are required •••• [R]egardless of how [these cases are] resolved, business
can be expected to challenge other regulatory actions of the Government.
One court has held that the EPA is required to issue an environmental impact statement in promulgating air pollution regulations. See Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1972, at 7,
col. I.
79. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1971).
80, Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 402(a)(4), 5Il(c)(2), added by Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816.
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mission is to protect the environment. The law neither requires nor
expects the EPA to give single-minded devotion to environmental
considerations. Many decisions confronting the EPA in the water pollution field involve trade-offs between environmental and economic
values where broad input is desirable, and a variety of pressures will
be felt by the regulators. If one regards the NEPA impact statement
procedure as truly workable and efficient, there appears to be no
substantial reason for exempting the agency that is most concerned
with environmental problems.
One detects in the desire of some environmental groups for an
ever broader scope of judicial review under NEPA a deep suspicion
of the intentions and capabilities of government. This suspicion is
understandable and by no means baseless, but the environmental
problems we face today cannot be dealt with by governmental immobility and inaction. Affirmative programs are required. A proper
concern with unleashing the motive power of government to regulate industry and natural resources supports the conclusion that the
brake of judicial review should not be too easily or too strongly applied.
V.

CONCLUSION

NEPA has been a force for constructive change in the federal
government. Its action-forcing character, which has served to institutionalize new inputs and perspectives, has made federal agencies
more sensitive to environmental considerations and nudged them
toward a decision-making process that embraces a broader spectrum
of values. It is hoped that federal agencies will seize the opportunity
for improved decision-making that NEPA has thrust upon them. In
areas such as transportation and energy, where national policy is
confused in content and diffused in administration, the President
and Congress will need to rethink fundamental questions and examine a broad range of regulatory alternatives. In the meantime,
reviewing courts should accord individual agencies, each of which
has only limited capacity to weigh competing values or to consider
broad alternatives, a substantial degree of discretion in the scope,
timing, and manner in which alternatives are examined and policies
reconsidered. NEPA should not be viewed as requiring that the
processes of government come to a standstill until all first principles
are re-examined. NEPA is a constant pressure in the right direction,
but it cannot in itself provide the organizational structure or the
intelligence and judgment that are prerequisites for needed change.
You can lead a horse to water, but ....

